
By Maldita.es
Following the events of July 30 and 31, 2026, online conversations quickly shifted towards another possible attempt to enter Ceuta in mid-August. Investigations by Maldita.es, an ATHENA project partner, tracked how discussion of a proposed August 15 crossing developed across WhatsApp, Facebook and Instagram, and how false claims became embedded in the same information environment.
This is Part 2 of a two-part ATHENA series on the online information environment surrounding the Ceuta events. Part 1 examined mobilisation before July 30 and the misleading interpretation of a Spanish Supreme Court ruling that circulated widely at the time.
A new date begins to circulate
According to Maldita.es’s investigation into the August 15 planning, within days of the July 30-31 events, posts and messages began referring to another possible crossing on August 15. Maldita.es investigated how these discussions were developing across several platforms rather than focusing on a single social network.
In its initial investigation, Maldita.es entered four WhatsApp groups and monitored ten Facebook groups linked to the discussion. It also identified more than 50 Instagram accounts publishing material about the proposed August 15 date.
The investigation revealed that the same conversation behaved differently depending on the platform where it appeared. Facebook’s large groups offered reach and visibility. Instagram played a more visual role in amplifying the proposed date. WhatsApp, by contrast, involved smaller communities and more direct discussion.
Taken together, the findings show a cross-platform information ecosystem rather than three separate conversations. Visibility on one platform could direct users towards another, where the discussion became more focused and less publicly observable.

A false claim about August 15
Within this same environment, another Maldita.es investigation found that a false claim was circulating stating that the Spanish government had announced a temporary opening of the border on August 15.
Maldita.es checked the claim against official communications and contacted the Spanish government’s communications department. No special opening of this kind had been announced. The border crossings at Ceuta and Melilla continued to operate under their existing regulated arrangements; this did not amount to an unrestricted opening of the border.
The false message nevertheless appeared in social-media posts and WhatsApp discussions connected to the proposed August 15 crossing. Importantly, Maldita.es also documented users questioning the claim and asking whether it was true. The investigation therefore does not show that everyone in these groups accepted the misinformation. Instead, it demonstrates how an inaccurate claim can become part of the same communication space in which real planning, uncertainty, rumours and genuine news are being discussed.

When coordination spaces also become information spaces
This is one of the central challenges in analysing contemporary information manipulation.
A messaging group created around a possible real-world action is not only a coordination space. It is also an information space. Participants can exchange screenshots, media reports, rumours, interpretations of legal developments and content copied from other platforms.
As material moves repeatedly between Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp, the boundary between verified information, speculation and misinformation can become difficult for participants to distinguish — especially during a fast-moving event.
The Ceuta case also shows why researchers should be careful not to infer more from online activity than the available evidence supports. A group discussing a particular date does not establish that an event will occur. A viral message does not establish that all participants believe it. And repeated content does not necessarily establish a centrally coordinated campaign.
Why this matters for ATHENA
For ATHENA, the August 15 case provides a concrete example of how online mobilisation and disinformation can interact across platforms.
The investigation shows a possible progression: large public groups provide visibility; visual social networks amplify a date or narrative; smaller messaging groups allow more focused discussion; and misleading information can move through all of these spaces alongside legitimate information.
Understanding that progression requires more than simply identifying whether a claim is true or false. Analysts also need to study timing, platform roles, patterns of amplification, links between communities and the behaviour of the actors involved.
This is particularly important when assessing possible information manipulation and interference. Evidence of misinformation is one element of the picture, but attribution requires additional evidence about who is responsible, how actors are connected and whether behaviour is deliberately coordinated.
Together, the two Ceuta investigations demonstrate why information-environment analysis must combine content, behaviour and cross-platform context. Doing so helps distinguish organic discussion, opportunistic amplification, disinformation and potentially coordinated influence activity without collapsing them into a single category.
Return to Part 1: Mobilisation and Misleading Claims Around July 30
References
Maldita.es (10 August 2026). “Spain has announced that the border will open on 15 August”: how this disinformation is circulating in WhatsApp groups, among surveys and plans to enter Ceuta from Morocco.
https://maldita.es/investigaciones/20260810/plans-whatsapp-ceuta-morocco-disinformation/
Maldita.es (3 August 2026). “What’s the plan?”: Inside the WhatsApp, Facebook and Instagram groups organising a new crossing into Ceuta from Morocco for August 15. https://maldita.es/investigaciones/20260803/whatsapp-facebook-instagram-new-crossing-ceuta-august-15/