Forecasting the Future of FIMI: Key Findings from ATHENA’s Mini-Delphi

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By Pedro Peres Cavalcante (Trilateral Research)

Forecasting is not an easy task, especially if it involves a constantly changing scenario being reshaped by grand technological leaps in short periods of time. When it comes to FIMI, having a fair understanding of what is yet to come is paramount to curb the nefarious effects of influence operations. That is why we decided to seek opinions from experts in a mini-Delphi consultation to get a comprehensive panorama of how FIMI may evolve in the next three to five years, taking into consideration the latest technologies and their expected impact.
In this blogpost, we highlight some of our main findings.

Methodology

Why a mini-Delphi?

The Delphi method leverages the expertise of a small group to increase the reliability and accuracy of predictions and judgements regarding contexts in which pure model based statistics methods are disadvantageous given the lack of pre-existing historical, economic and technical data.

Delphi-based studies are oriented towards the achievement of consensus: a stabilised, collective view obtained through subsequent rounds can provide a safer predictive picture of what’s to come. Instead of taking the usual Delphi approach, under which respondents’ inputs are funneled through usually three rounds of consultation to reach a consensus position, we went with a reduced, modified version of a Delphi, using two rounds of consultation and focusing on having a comprehensive, non-exclusionary view of the phenomenon.

The questionnaire

We posed seven questions to respondents featuring both closed and open-ended questions. Questions sought to understand, among other things, what technologies would most likely impact disinformation in the upcoming years, what impacts are expected by the rise in FIMI, what countermeasures governments and individuals can take against disinformation.

Responses were aggregated in a synthesis report, which was shared with respondents for feedback and amendments: in view of the opinions mapped, respondents could amend their responses, if they wished. We received additional comments from only three respondents, which we incorporated into a consolidated consensus report.


Respondents’ profile

We initially curated a list of 85 experts, out of which 77 were successfully reached. We achieved 27 responses from professionals working with disinformation, cyber warfare, FIMI and cybersecurity in civil society, academia and private businesses. While most respondents were experts external to the ATHENA project, nine were members of the project’s Stakeholder Board.


Highlights

Respondents predicted a huge surge in disinformation to come: 88% of them saw an increase in disinformation over the next three to five years of between 100% and 1000%. Responses also indicated that artificial intelligence applications – especially generative AI ones – dominate the predictions for technologies set to impact disinformation. Social media algorithms, alongside microtargeting techniques and closed networks and messenger apps were also viewed as most impactful to disinformation operations and campaigns. This reveals impacts span over how disinformation content is produced, how and where it is disseminated, and to whom.

When it comes to impacts, respondents predicted an escalation of impacts already caused by disinformation. The most recurrent impacts covered by respondents were the following:

1. Amplification of foreign influence operations associated with countries’ destabilisation

2. Delegitimization of scientific consensus and public health guidance

3. Increase in violence, real-world harms and sectarian conflicts

4. Hyper targeted harassment and manipulation towards specific communities

5. Manipulation of the stock market


From the foresight of experts, we see disinformation’s grip over various domains: geopolitics, overall trust in health and science, social relations, social discrimination, and the economy. These, however, only represent the most anticipated impacts. In our consensus report, impacts branch out numerously.

Regarding countermeasures governments can take to safeguard against FIMI, respondents answered vigorously pointing to the need for more regulation by enforcing and enhancing already enacted legislation as well as developing new regulatory responses. The interplay between successfully impeding disinformation contents from spreading and not allowing regulations to degenerate into censorship platforms was also captured in responses, with a few experts mentioning the age-old dilemma between freedom of expression and effective content moderation. Experts also emphasised the importance of finding ways to enhance platform accountability. Increasing algorithmic transparency and labelling AI-generated content and manipulated media were some specific actions mentioned by respondents.

Public investments in media and digital literacy initiatives were also among the most recurrent responses of governmental countermeasures against disinformation. Experts saw a need to: (a) develop strategies suited to reach different target groups (both in terms of age and education-wise), (b) invest in varied approaches (such as gamification), and (c) keep initiatives in sync with the latest developments in technology.

When asked about which measures individuals can take to guard against disinformation, experts mapped a range of competences in the media and digital literacy. In our analysis, using technologies as an ally against disinformation (developing more advanced technological skills and using LLMs as allies, for example) stood out among the mapped suggestions.


What’s next

As said in the report, much as it is a useful current portrait of technologies impacting disinformation, we acknowledge that the constantly changing scenarios in which these technologies emerge require agile and adaptable responses able to remain relevant over time.

While this report is just a starting point for ATHENA’s foresight and policymaking work package, its results are a guiding compass for the policy recommendations to be made.

You can read the full consensus report on technologies likely to impact disinformation
in the next three to five years here.

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Posted by: Nayara Güércio (Trilateral Research)